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Opinion evolution in closed community.
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Abstract A simple Ising spin model which can describe a mechanism of
making a decision in a closed community is proposed. It is shown via standard
Monte Carlo simulations that very simple rules lead to rather complicated
dynamics and to a power law in the decision time distribution. It is found
that a closed community has to evolve either to a dictatorship or a stalemate
state (inability to take any common decision). A common decision can be
taken in a ”democratic way” only by an open community.
Keywords: 87.23.Ge Dynamics of social systems; 75.50.Lk Spin glasses
and other random magnets; 05.65.+b Self-organized systems
1 Introduction
The Ising spin system is undoubtedly one of the most frequently used models
of statistical mechanics. Recently, this model has also become the most
popular physics export article to ”other branches of science” such as biology,
economy or sociology [1, 2, 3, 4]. There are two main reasons for that: first
verbalized by Nobel prize winner Peter.B.Medawar - ”physics envy” (quoted
e.g. by R. Dawkins in [5]) - a syndrome appearing in some researchers who
would like to have such beautiful and relatively simple models as physicists
have (for example the Ising model). On the other hand, some physicists
would like to be better understandable by non-physicists and create theories
which could not be so univocally verified or falsified like in the classical areas
of physics. It is rather obvious that Ising-type models cannot explain origins
of very complicated phenomena observed in complex systems. However, it is
believed that these kind of models could describe some universal behaviour
connected, for example, with selforganization of systems [6, 7] or in other
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words, justify the existence of some power laws, which recently makes many
scientists very happy [8]. Between many exotic applications of Ising spin
models these referring to the problem of a democratic choice of a one among
two possibilities seem to be the most natural [2, 4, 9, 10, 11].
2 Model
Let us consider a community which time and again should take a stand in
some matter, for example vote on a president in a two-party system. If each
member of the community can take only two attitudes (A or B) then in
several votes one expects some difference m of voters for A and against. We
assume three limiting cases:
(i) all members of the community vote for A (an ”all A” state),
(ii) all members of the community vote for B (an ”all B” state),
(iii) 50% vote for A and 50% vote for B,
which should be the stable solutions of our model.
The aim of the paper is to analyze the time evolution of m. To model the
above mentioned system we consider an Ising spins chain (Si; i = 1, 2, . . .N)
with the following dynamic rules:
– if SiSi+1 = 1 then Si−1 and Si+2 take the direction of the pair (i,i+1),
(r1)
– if SiSi+1 = −1 then Si−1 takes the direction of Si+1 and Si+2 the
direction of Si. (r2)
These rules describe the influence of a given pair on the decision of its
nearest neighbours. When members of a pair have the same opinion then
their nearest neighbours agree with them. On the contrary, when members
of a pair have opinions different then the nearest neighbour of each member
disagrees with him (her). These dynamic rules lead to the three steady
states above. However, the third steady state (50% for A and 50% for B)
is realized in a very special way. Every member of the community disagrees
with his (her) nearest neighbour (it is easy to see that the Ising model with
only next nearest neighbour interaction has such fixed points: ferro- and
antiferromagnetic state). This rule is in accordance with the well known
sentence ”united we stand divided we fall ”. So, from now on we will call our
model - USDF.
2
3 Isolated System
To investigate our model we perform a standard Monte Carlo simulation with
random updating. We consider a chain of N Ising spins with free boundary
conditions. In our simulations we were taking usually N = 1000, but we have
done simulations also for N = 10000. We start from a totally random initial
state i.e. to each site of the chain we assign an arrow with a randomly chosen
direction: up or down (Ising spin). For this case we obtain of course, as a
final state, one of the three fixed points (1-3, i.e. AAAA, BBBB, ABAB)
with probability 0.25,0.25 and 0.5, respectively. The typical relaxation time
for N = 1000 is ∼ 104 Monte Carlo steps (MCS). The space distribution of
spins from the initial to a steady state is shown in Fig. 1. For intermediate
states one can see the formation of clusters.
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Figure 1: Spatial distribution of spins for (a) the initial state, (b-e) interediate
states, (f) the final (steady) state; time interval between states is 10000 MCS
3
Let us define the decision as a magnetization, i.e.:
m =
1
N
N∑
i=1
Si. (1)
In Fig. 2 we present typical time evolution of m and to compare certain
empirical data on ”social mood” [12]. Without any external stimulation
decision can change dramatically in a relatively short time. Such strongly
non-monotonic behaviour of the change of m is typically observed in the
USDF model when the system evolves towards the third steady state (total
disagreement or in magnetic language the antiferromagnetic state).
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Figure 2: Time evolution of decision m taken from empirical data [12](upper)
(question:”do you think future will be good?” asked to N = 1100 adults) and
simulation from a random initial state (lower) for N = 1000
To measure the time correlation of m we use classical autocorrelation
4
function:
G(∆t) =
∑
(m(t)− < m >) (m(t+∆t)− < m >)∑
(m(t)− < m >)2
. (2)
Comparison of simulation results with empirical data is shown in Fig.3.
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Figure 3: Autocorrelation for empirical data (upper) and simulations (lower)
evaluated from data shown on Fig.2
It seems interesting to follow changes of one particular individual. The
dynamic rules we have introduced lead to an amazing effect - if an individual
changes his (her) opinion at time t he (she) will probably change it also
at time t + 1. Like in the Bak Sand-Pile model one change can cause an
avalanche [6, 7]. On the other hand an individual can stay for a long time
without changing his (her) decision. Let us denote by τ the time needed by
an individual to change his (her) opinion. From Fig. 3 it can be seen that
τ is usually very short, but sometimes can be very long. The distribution of
(τ) (P (τ)) follows a power law with an exponent −3/2 (see Fig. 4).
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Figure 4: Distribution of decision time τ follows a power law.
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We have also analysed the influence of the initial conditions on the evolu-
tion of the system. We have done it in two different ways - randomly and in
clusters. In both cases we start from an initial concentration cB of opinion B.
In the random setup cB ∗N individuals are randomly (uniformly) chosen out
of all N individuals. In the cluster setup simply the first cB ∗N individuals
are chosen.
It turns out that the distribution of decision time τ still follows the power
law with the same exponent as shown in Fig.4. A non-monotonic behaviour of
decision change is still typical and sometimes even much stronger. However,
it is obvious that if initially there is more A’s thenB’s the final state should be
more often ”all A” then ”all B”. Dependence between initial concentration
of B and the probability of steady state S (AAAA,BBBB or ABAB) is
shown in Fig. 5.
There is no significant difference between the ”cluster” and ”random
case”. Although it should be noted that the ”random case” is not well de-
fined, because there is a number of random initial states. However, averaging
over different initial random conditions gives a similar result to the ”cluster
case”.
Observe that cB > 0.7 is needed to obtain final state ”all B” with proba-
bility grater than 0.5 (see Fig.5). Dependence between cB and the probability
of steady state ”all B” is well fitted by a power function with an exponent
2.12.
4 Information noise
It is well known that the changes of opinion are determined by the social
impact [13]. In the previous section we have considered a community in
which a change of an individuals opinion is caused only by a contact with
its neighbours. It was the simplest social impact one can imagine. Now, we
introduce to our model noise p (similar to the ”social temperature” [2]), which
is the probability that an individual, instead of following the dynamic rules,
will make a random decision. We start from an ”all A” state to investigate if
there is a p ∈ (0, 1) which does not throw the system out of this state. Time
evolution of the decision from the ”all A” state is shown in Fig. 6.
It can be seen that for very small p ∼ 10−6 deviations from the steady
state are slight and the system is almost totally ordered. If p increases
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Figure 5: Dependence between the initial concentration of B and the final
state. Averaging was done over 1000 samples.
8
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
p=10−6
MCS
m
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
MCS
m
p=3*10−6
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
MCS
m
p=10−5
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
p=10−4
MCS
m
Figure 6: Figure 6: Time evolution of decision m from an initial state ”all
A” for different values of noise p.
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than the deviations are of course larger and the system goes to a completely
disordered state. This suggests that there is some value of p = p∗ below
which the system is ordered. However, on the basis of our simulations we
can only determine that p∗ ∈ [10−6, 10−5]. If we take totally random initial
conditions and p < p∗ the system will reach, after some relaxation time, one
of the three steady states.
In the previous section we have shown that the distribution P (τ) follows
a power law with an exponent ∼ −3/2. The same distribution for different
values of p is shown in Fig. 7. In the limit p→ 0 distribution P (τ) indeed fol-
lows a power law, whereas for p→ 1 the distribution is exponential. Between
these two extreme values of p the distribution P (τ) consists of two parts -
exponential for large values of τ and a power law with exponent ω ∼ −3/2
for small values of τ . Thus we can write:
P (τ) ∼
{
τ−ω for τ < τ ∗, ω ∼ 3
2
exp(aτ) for τ > τ ∗,
(3)
where τ ∗ decreases with increasing p. For p = 0, τ ∗ = ∞ and for p = 1,
τ ∗ = 0.
5 Discussion
We have proposed a simple model called USDF, which can describe a ”black
and white” way of making a decision, where unanimity or disagreement of
a given pair causes unanimity or disagreement to its nearest neighbours,
respectively. If such a mechanism of taking a decision by a community is
correct our model leads to the following conclusions:
(i) In a closed (isolated) community there are only two possibilities of
a final state: dictatorship or stalemate. After a shorter or longer time our
model tends to one of the steady ”ordered” states (1-3). It means either
a total unanimity if the system goes to the state 1(2) or inability to take
any common decision if it goes to 3. However, small but finite information
noise (open community) leads to disorder and the system does not go to any
steady state. In this case there is a possibility of taking a common decision
in a democratic way.
(ii) A change of opinion is followed by further changes. Periods of frequent
changes of opinions are followed by periods of stagnancy.
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Figure 7: Distribution of decision time P (τ) for different values of noise p.
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(iii) A relatively small group (a few percent of the whole population) by
a favourable coincidence can bring to a stalemate. But in order to win the
group has to be quite large. For example, if the group wants to have a 50%
chance of winning it should consist of more than 70% of all individuals. It
means that in order to change an existing law (for example that pornography
is illegal) usually over 70% of the population have to vote for change. A
similar effect was observed by Galam [10].
(iv) For finite information noise p, there is some characteristic time of a
decision change τ∗ which depends on a value of p. For the decision time less
than τ∗, the distribution of decision time τ follows a power-law.
(v) The distribution of decision time τ for p = 0 and for p < 1 and τ < τ∗
follows the ”universal” power-law with exponent ω ∼ 3/2 independently of
the initial conditions (totally random or clustered state).
The proposed very simple rules (r1, r2) leads to a rather complicated
dynamics but one can doubt if these rules properly describe real mechanisms
of taking a decision. There are of course other possibilities within the Ising
spin model. For example, if the members of a given community are less
prone to oppose nearest neighbours then one should keep rule (r1) and skip
rule (r2). This means that if SiSi+1 = −1 then nothing is changed in the
system. In this case there are only two steady states ”all A” and ”all B”.
Our simulations suggest that in such a closed community there is a tendency
to create two opposite clusters but the final state must be total unanimity
(dictatorship). This result is rather obvious, it is easier to carry one’s opinion
if the members of the community are peaceable or less active. For a while this
can be of profit to the community but finally it must lead to a dictatorship.
It should be noted that also in this case the distribution of the decision time
follows the same power-law like in the USDF model with ω ∼ 3/2.
In an other model which we call ”if you do not know what to do, just
do nothing” an individual’s opinion depends on opinions of his (her) nearest
neighbours. If the opinion of these neighbours is unanimity (Si−1Si+1 = 1)
then the i-th individual agrees with them if not the i-th individual does
not change his (her) opinion. In this case the number of steady states is
enormous. Namely, each state different than ABAB (antiferromagnetic) is a
steady state. It means that if we start with a random distribution of opinions
A and B there will be a tendency to create small clusters.
It is rather obvious that in a real community all mentioned and many
others mechanisms can effect an opinion evolution...
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